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Functional Dissociation in Frontal and Striatal Areas for
Processing of Positive and Negative Reward Information
Xun Liu,1David K. Powell,2HongbinWang,3 Brian T. Gold,1 Christine R. Corbly,1 and Jane E. Joseph1
1Department of Anatomy and Neurobiology and 2Magnetic Resonance Imaging and Spectroscopy Center, University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky
40536, and 3School of Health Information Sciences, University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston, Houston, Texas 77030
Reward-seeking behavior depends critically on processing of positive and negative information at various stages such as reward antici-
pation, outcome monitoring, and choice evaluation. Behavioral and neuropsychological evidence suggests that processing of positive
(e.g., gain) and negative (e.g., loss) reward information may be dissociable and individually disrupted. However, it remains uncertain
whether different stages of reward processing share certain neural circuitry in frontal and striatal areas, and whether distinct but
interactive systems in these areas are recruited for positive and negative reward processing. To explore these issues, we used amonetary
decision-making task to investigate the roles of frontal and striatal areas at all three stages of reward processing in the same event-related
functional magnetic resonance imaging experiment. Participants were instructed to choose whether to bet or bank a certain number of
chips. If they decided to bank or if they lost a bet, they started over betting one chip. If they won a bet, the wager was doubled in the next
round. Positive reward anticipation, winning outcome, and evaluation of right choices activated the striatum andmedial/middle orbito-
frontal cortex, whereas negative reward anticipation, losing outcome, and evaluation of wrong choices activated the lateral orbitofrontal
cortex, anterior insula, superior temporal pole, and dorsomedial frontal cortex. These findings suggest that the valence of reward
information and counterfactual comparisonmore strongly predict a functional dissociation in frontal and striatal areas than do various
stages of reward processing. These distinct but interactive systems may serve to guide human’s reward-seeking behavior.
Key words: event-related fMRI; reward; orbitofrontal cortex; striatum; anterior insula; dorsomedial frontal cortex
Introduction
Being able to adequately process reward information is essential
to our physical, mental, as well as socioeconomic well being (Fel-
lows, 2004). Alterations in the reward system have been associ-
ated with various neuropsychiatric disorders, including depres-
sion (Drevets, 2001), pathological gambling (Goudriaan et al.,
2004), substance abuse (Volkow et al., 2003; Bechara, 2005; Ga-
ravan and Stout, 2005), eating disorders and obesity (Volkow and
Wise, 2005), and schizophrenia (Chau et al., 2004).
Recent neuroimaging studies on human reward circuitry have
implicated many brain regions, including the orbitofrontal cor-
tex (OFC) and striatum. These structures are themain projection
areas of two distinct dopaminergic pathways, the mesocortical
andmesolimbic pathways, respectively. Although it has been sug-
gested that midbrain dopamine neurons play a major role in
reward processing (Schultz, 2002, 2006) in that they code predic-
tion errors between actual and anticipated reward (Holroyd and
Coles, 2002;Montague andBerns, 2002;Montague et al., 2006), it
remains unclear how dopamine neurons modulate frontal and
striatal areas at various stages of reward processing. For example,
potentially because of differences in experimental paradigms,
there have beenmixed results as towhether the striatumandOFC
are responsible for reward anticipation or reward outcome (Bre-
iter et al., 2001; Knutson et al., 2001b; McClure et al., 2003; Ram-
nani et al., 2004; Rogers et al., 2004; Tanaka et al., 2004; Delgado
et al., 2005). Another issue is whether there are functionally dis-
tinct systems to process reward information of positive (e.g.,
gain) or negative (e.g., loss) valence (Kringelbach, 2005).
Whereas some studies suggest thatmedial areas (e.g.,medialOFC
and striatum) are sensitive to relative gains (O’Doherty et al.,
2001;Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005) and lateral areas (e.g., lateralOFC
and anterior insula) for loss or punishment (O’Doherty et al.,
2003a; Ullsperger and von Cramon, 2003), other studies found
that activity of the caudate nucleus and insula was independent of
the valence of outcomes (Elliott et al., 2000; Delgado et al., 2003).
To a certain extent, these mixed results highlight some of the
important distinctions in human decision-making research, such
as expected values and utilities (vonNeumann andMorgenstern,
1944; Knutson et al., 2005; Tobler et al., 2006), framing and pros-
pect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahne-
man, 1981; Trepel et al., 2005), and cognitive-affective interac-
tion (Loomes and Sugden, 1982; Mellers, 2000; Ursu and Carter,
2005).
To better understand the functions of reward circuitry at dif-
ferent stages, the present functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) study used one experiment to examine three reward pro-
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cesses, including reward anticipation, outcome monitoring, and
choice evaluation. In a computerized gambling task, participants
chose to bet or bank a certain number of chips and received
consequences (Fig. 1). With this interactive task, we were able to
examine brain activation patterns for positive and negative con-
ditions at various phases of reward processing. We found a func-
tional dissociation in frontal and striatal areas for processing of
positive and negative reward information and counterfactual
comparison. These distinct but interactive systems may serve to
guide human’s reward-seeking behavior.
Materials andMethods
Participants. Seventeen right-handed, native English speakers (age range,
18–45 years; average age of 26 8; ninewomen)were recruited from the
local community. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision. We screened the participants for neurological, psychiatric, and
medical conditions through self-report. Potential volunteers were ex-
cluded if they reported taking any medications that affected CNS func-
tion (in consultation with a doctor associated with our protocol). None
of the participants in the present study reported taking suchmedications,
and none reported any major neurological, psychiatric, or medical con-
ditions (including substance abuse and learning disabilities). We did not
ask questions with regard to menstrual cycle for female participants. A
signed informed consent form approved by University of Kentucky In-
stitutional Review Board was obtained from each participant before the
experiment. Two male participants were excluded from data analysis
because of excessive head motion (absolute displacement with regard to
the reference scan exceeded half a voxel size, 1.75 mm).
Design and task. The task was a gambling game, in which participants
decidedwhether to bet or bank a certain number of chips at each trial. For
incentive, the final compensation for their participation included a bo-
nus of $5.00 to $15.00 based on the total number of chips they earned at
the end of the experiment, in addition to the hourly payment.
The game proceeded as follows (Fig. 1A). Each participant started off
with 10 complimentary chips in the bank and used one as the first wager.
In each trial, the participant had to decide whether to bank or bet the
current wager. If she decided to bank, she would immediately earn the
current wager (i.e., the wager would be added to the bank). If she decided
to bet, the betting result would depend on a subsequent dice roll. If she
lost the bet, thewagerwas confiscated, and she needed to get another chip
out of her bank to continue the next trial. If she won the bet, the wager
would be doubled and she could continue with a doubled wager. When
the current wager reached 16 chips, the chips would be banked automat-
ically and the game started over. As shown in Figure 1A (the dotted
“look” line), one critical manipulation of the current experimental de-
sign was that even when she decided to bank, she would still witness the
following dice-throwing process and be informed of the outcome. Note
that this outcome is counterfactual in that it represents what would have
happened if she had chosen to bet. One of our major interests was to
investigate whether there are distinct brain activation patterns in factual
versus counterfactual conditions.
There were two levels of risk involved. For the low risk condition,
participants were informed the following: “The risk of the bet is relatively
low. If the dice is 1 or 2, you lose. Otherwise you win. Your chance of
winning against losing the bet is 2–1.” For the high-risk condition, they
were told the following: “The risk of the bet is relatively high. If the dice is
1, 2, or 3, you lose. Otherwise you win. Your chance of winning against
losing the bet is 1–1.” The outcome sequence of the trials (winning or
losing) was predetermined by the computer in a random manner but
constrained by the risk level. Tomake the dice roll resultmore salient, the
border of the dice was depicted as green if it was a “win” trial or red if it
was a “lose” trial. To ensure that participants understood the procedures,
they were trained for 10 trials of each risk level before they performed the
task in the scanner.
Procedures. An event-related design was implemented. A trial con-
sisted of four different events in a fixed order: a chip number event
indicating the current wager (i.e., the chips at stake), a response-
collecting event asking participants to bank or bet the chips, an outcome
event indicating a winning or losing dice roll regardless of the partici-
pant’s choice to bet or bank, and a blank eventwith a central fixation (Fig.
1B). Each event within a trial lasted 2 s, except for the blank event, which
was displayed for either 2, 4, or 6 s randomly. The first four scans (8 s) of
each run were used as a buffer. The remainder of each run consisted of a
total of 42 trials. Four runswere acquired for each participant, two for the
high-risk condition and two for the low-risk condition. The order of the
risk conditions was counter-balanced across the four runs within each
participant as well as across participants.
One potential issue with such a fixed order of events was that neuronal
responses evoked by different components within a trial might become
highly correlated and hard to be differentially estimated. We considered
as an alternative, a jittered design (i.e., jittering every event within a trial),
which would significantly increase the trial length and the length of the
session. However, this could compromise data quality by introducing
more motion artifact resulting from longer scanning sessions. Another
alternative was to have a jittered design but reduce the number of trials,
keeping the session length the same as in the present design. However,
reducing the number of trials would reduce detection power caused by
reduced repetition of experimental conditions. For these reasons, we
chose the present design, but we address the concern of potential corre-
lations among events in the fMRI data analysis and behavioral results
below.
Data acquisition. A 3T Siemens (Erlangen, Germany) Trio magnetic
resonance imaging system located at the University of Kentucky Mag-
netic Resonance Imaging and Spectroscopy Center equipped for echo-
planar imaging (EPI) was used for data acquisition. EPI images were
acquired with an eight-channel head coil using the blood oxygen level-
dependent (BOLD) technique (repetition time, 2000 ms; echo time, 29
ms; flip angle, 76°), each consisting of 34 contiguous axial slices (matrix,
64 64; in-plane resolution, 3.5 3.5mm2; thickness, 3.5mm; no gap),
parallel to the inside curve of each participant’s OFC to reduce the signal
loss and distortion in this region (Deichmann et al., 2003). A high-
resolution T1-weighted magnetization-prepared rapid gradient echo
(MP-RAGE) anatomical set (192 sagittal slices of full head;matrix, 224
Figure1. Reward flowchart (top) and task procedures (bottom). Participantswere informed
the result (win or lose) even if they decided to bank on a trial.
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256; field of view, 224  256 mm2; slice thickness, 1 mm; no gap) was
collected for each participant.
Stimuli were presented using a high-resolution rear projection system
with responses recorded via two fiber-optics response pads, each with
one button. A computer running E-Prime controlled stimulus presenta-
tion and recording of responses. In addition, the timing of the stimulus
presentation was synchronized with magnet trigger pulses.
Image analysis.Before statistical analysis, the first four volumes of each
run were discarded to allow the MR signal to reach steady state. The
remaining images in each participant’s time series weremotion corrected
using the MCFLIRT module of FSL (FMRIB Software Library, version
3.2) package (http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl). Images in the data series
were then spatially smoothed with a three-dimensional Gaussian kernel
(full-width half-maximum, 7  7  7 mm3) and temporally filtered
using a high-pass filter (90 s). The FEAT (FMRIB Expert Analysis Tool)
module of FSL package was used for these steps and later statistical
analysis.
Customized square waveforms were generated for each individual.
These waveforms were convolved with a double gamma hemodynamic
response function (HRF). For each participant, we used FILM (FMRIB
Improved Linear Model), with local autocorrelation correction, to esti-
mate the hemodynamic parameters for four explanatory variables (the
number of chips, bank or bet, loss or win, and wrong or right) and
generate statistical contrastmaps of interest. Given the concern about the
fixed order of events within a trial, we expected that the right/wrong
regressor would be correlated with the other two regressors given this
variable was determined by the combination of the other two variables
(bet-win and bank-loss constituted the right choices, whereas bet-loss
and bank-win constituted the wrong choices). However, we expected
that the bet/bank regressor would not highly correlate with the win/loss
regressor because of randomness and unpredictability of the outcomes.
Considering the nature of these regressors, we constructed a general
linear model, orthogonizing the right/wrong regressor with regard to the
win/loss regressor, basically similar to a partial correlation analysis to
partial out the brain activation patterns uniquely explained by each re-
gressor. It should be noted that a significant correlation between these
regressors limits the sensitivity to discriminate between different phases.
Each of the four runs for each participant was analyzed separately, and
the average of these four runs for each individual was obtained through a
higher level analysis using the FLAME (FMRIB Local Analysis of Mixed
Effects)module (stage 1 only). Contrastmapswerewarped into common
stereotaxic space before mixed-effects group analyses were performed.
The normalization procedure involved regis-
tering the average EPI image to the MP-RAGE
image from the same participant and then to
the ICBM152 T1 template, using the FLIRT
(FMRIB Linear Image Registration Tool)
module.
To identify the regions of brain activation,we
defined the regions of interest (ROIs) by clus-
ters of 30 or more contiguous voxels (Xiong et
al., 1995) in which there was significant differ-
ence in brain activity across conditions (Z 
2.81; p 0.005, two-tailed). Using the Mintun
peak algorithm (Mintun et al., 1989), we fur-
ther located the local peaks (maximal activa-
tion) within each ROI. Additional ROI analyses
were performed using the average signals ex-
tracted from these clusters.
Results
Behavioral results
We present the descriptive statistics ac-
cording to different reward processes (e.g.,
frequency and proportion of positive ver-
sus negative reward anticipation and
choice evaluation). Because the frequen-
cies of reward outcomes (e.g., win vs loss)
were predefined, we report the net earning
of chips for each run instead.
Reward anticipation and decisionmaking: bet (positive)
versus bank (negative)
The ideal ratio of bet versus bank should be 1:1 for the high-risk
condition and 2:1 for the low-risk condition based on the pre-
defined ratios of win versus loss in these conditions. However,
there was a strong tendency for participants to bet the chips,
2(1) 17.922, p 104 (against no bias) (Fig. 2A). The ratio of
bet versus bank was 2.72 overall. This bias to bet was stronger for
the low-risk condition than for the high-risk condition, as indi-
cated by a significant interaction between the choices (bet vs
bank) and the levels of risk (high vs low), 2(1)  37.578, p 
109 (against no bias across the levels of risk). For the low-risk
condition, the ratio of bet versus bank was 3.58, 2(1)  5.006,
p  0.025 (against the ideal ratio of 2:1); and for the high-risk
condition, the ratio was 2.13, 2(1) 10.906, p 0.001 (against
the ideal ratio of 1:1). Furthermore, within a risk condition, there
was a significant interaction between the choice (bet vs bank) and
the outcomeof the previous trial (win vs loss). Specifically, for the
high-risk condition, participants were equally likely to bet or
bank after awin under thewin–loss ratio of 1:1 (bet–bank ratio of
0.97, 2(1) 0.009, p 0.925) but were more likely to bet after
a loss (bet–bank ratio of 5.97 against the ideal ratio of 1:1,
2(1) 20.769, p 105), 2(1) 20.778, p 105 (Fig. 2B).
For the low-risk condition, participants were twice as likely to bet
than bank after a win under the win–loss ratio of 2:1 (bet–bank
ratio of 2.25, 2(1)  0.156, p  0.693) but were biased to bet
after a loss (bet–bank ratio of 17.59 against the ideal ratio of 2:1,
2(1)  9.588, p  0.002), 2(1)  9.744, p  0.002 (Fig. 2C).
These findings indicated that participants tended to be risk-
taking to maximize monetary gain, particularly when they were
losing. Relatively lower risk level further promoted such risk-
seeking behavior.
Choice evaluation: right (positive) versus wrong (negative)
Whenparticipants bet andwonorwhen they banked and avoided
a potential loss, the choices were “right” and these conditions
Figure 2. Behavioral results. The figures show the frequency of bank versus bet (A), conditional probability of bank and bet
based on the outcomeof previous trial (B, C), frequency of right andwrong choices (D,E), andnumber of chips earned for each run
(F ). There were 84 trials across two runs for each risk level.
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represented positive choice evaluation.
When they bet but lost or when they
banked but could have won if they had de-
cided to bet, the choices were “wrong” and
these conditions represented negative
choice evaluation. As seen in Figure 2D,
participants made approximately equal
number of right or wrong choices during
the high-risk condition, 2(1)  1.190,
p  0.275, and relatively more right
choices during the low-risk condition,
2(1)  5.902, p  0.015. In fact, they
made right choices approximately two
times as frequently as wrong ones, which
was about the same as the win–loss ratio of
2:1 for the low-risk condition, 2(1) 
0.440, p  0.507. Further breakdown of
right andwrong choices is shown in Figure
2E. These patterns suggested that partici-
pants implicitly adopted the ideal strategy, which was prescribed
by the predefined ratios of win versus loss, although they were
biased toward risk-taking after a loss.
Number of chips earned
Figure 2F shows the total number of chips earned for each of the
high- and low-risk runs. Participants broke even during the high-
risk condition and gained chips during the low-risk condition.
Repeated-measures ANOVA with the risk levels and runs
(within-subject) and orders of the risk levels (between-subject)
revealed that the number of chips gained was significantly af-
fected by the risk levels [F(1,13)  86.886, mean squared error
(MSE) 28.550, p 0.000), the runs (F(1,13) 9.6859, MSE
17.704, p 0.008), andmarginally by the orders of the risk levels
(F(1,13)  4.061, MSE  67.401, p  0.065). This further con-
firmed that participants performed within the reasonable range,
such that they did not gain or lose when the risk was at the chance
level and profited when the odds were favorable.
Correlation between decision, outcome, and evaluation
There were moderate correlations among the variables for differ-
ent stages of reward processing. As expected, correlations be-
tween decision (bet vs bank) and outcome (win vs loss) were
moderate, given that of 60 total correlation analyses (i.e., 15 sub-
jects  4 runs/subject) between the bet/bank and win/loss vari-
ables, only nine were significant. However, correlations between
thewin/loss and right/wrong variables were significant in 48 of 60
cases. After convolving with the HRF, correlations among these
regressors became slightly higher, with 17 of 60 significant for the
bet/bank andwin/loss regressors and 54 of 60 for thewin/loss and
right/wrong regressors. It should be noted that most of the sig-
nificant correlations between bet/bank and win/loss regressors
were negative, suggesting that it was not caused by the positive
correlation between bet/bank (1/1) andwin/loss (1/1) within
a trial, but by the negative correlation between consecutive trials.
As shown in Figure 2, B and C, the choice of the current trial was
affected by the outcome of the preceding trial. Specifically, par-
ticipants were more likely to bet after a loss than a win. As a
consequence, jittering the intertrial interval helped alleviate the
correlation between the bet/bank and win/loss regressors.
Imaging results
We report the imaging data related to three stages of reward
processing separately (i.e., reward anticipation and decision
making, reward delivery and outcome monitoring, and choice
evaluation). Although we also manipulated the levels of risk in
the study, this factor interactedwith different reward processes to
a minimal degree. This was possibly a result of separation of risk
levels into different runs, which reduced the statistical power of
detecting the difference caused by the risk levels. Nevertheless,
several frontal regions, including the superior, middle frontal
cortex, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), supplementary motor
areas, as well as the inferior and superior parietal cortex were
differentially activated by the high- and low-risk conditions. The
areasmodulated by the risk levels are listed in supplemental Table
1 (available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material).
Given that the two risk levels produced otherwise similar
brain activation patterns, the following analyses were based on
pooled data of both high- and low-risk conditions. The focus of
the results and discussion will be limited to the frontal cortex and
striatum, although there are interesting patterns of activation
observed in the posterior visual processing areas as well (supple-
mental Table 2, available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental
material).
Areas sensitive to reward anticipation and decisionmaking
(bet vs bank)
The contrast between bet and bank choices illustrated expecta-
tion of winning (positive anticipation) versus losing (negative
anticipation). Presumably, participants would take the risk and
bet if they thought theywere likely towin. In contrast, theywould
bank the wager to avoid a loss if they expected the outcome was
against them. As shown in Table 1, the caudate nucleus and me-
dial OFC were significantly more active when participants made
the bet than when they banked (Fig. 3A). In contrast, the lateral
OFC, inferior frontal, and superior medial frontal cortex as well
as the anterior insula showed greater activation when partici-
pants banked the chips in anticipation of losing the trial, com-
paredwithwhen they chose to bet in anticipation ofwinning (Fig.
3B).
According to many decision theories, the choice made at the
bet/bank decision stage may result from a combination of differ-
ent factors such as the probability assessment and risk tolerance,
framing of the context, and expected values (objective) andutility
(subjective) of different outcomes. We do not subscribe to any
particular one. Instead, we use “reward anticipation” to summa-
rize the net effect of all of these factors. Choosing a risky bet and
foregoing the sure gain of banking reflects a win of the positive
Table 1. Brain areas activated during the stage of reward anticipation and decisionmaking
Label BA Cluster size x y z Max Z
Bet bank
Med. OFC 11 297 4 38 12 3.53
25 87 6 16 8 3.46
Sup. frontal 6 36 26 2 68 3.09
Caudate nucleus 25 93 14 20 8 3.32
25 39 8 18 6 3.36
Bank bet
Inf. frontal 38 984 56 20 0 4.61
Lat. OFC 47 2492 48 34 6 4.79
10 114 40 60 2 3.61
Sup. frontal 10 85 20 62 18 3.37
6 33 32 8 66 3.45
Dorsomedial frontal 8 801 12 28 54 4.10
Insula 48 54 40 4 8 3.61
Insula/thalamus 48 558 34 18 4 4.49
BA, Brodmann area; Inf., inferior; Lat., lateral; Med., medial; Sup., superior; Max, maximum.
4590 • J. Neurosci., April 25, 2007 • 27(17):4587–4597 Liu et al. • Reward Anticipation, Delivery, and Evaluation
reward anticipation over the negative fear of loss. According to
calculation of expected values, it was unlikely that participants
made their decisions based on the expected values of the two
choices. The design of the task was such that the winning payoff
was doubled whenever participants bet and won. Therefore, in
the case of the high-risk condition where the odds were 1:1 for
win versus loss (50% to win), the expected
values for both decisions (bank and bet)
were the same on each specific trial. For
example, when the chip count was 1, bet-
ting the chip had the expected value of 1
( 2 50% 0 50%),whereas banking
the chip also had the expected value of 1
( 1 100%). If participants won the first
trial and had two chips to wager, the ex-
pected values of both “bet” and “bank” de-
cision were still matched for bet (4 
50%  0  50%) and bank (2  100%).
Therefore, the decision to “bet” or “bank”
could not be solely based on choosing the
option associated with a larger expected
value but rely on the outlook of the reward
outcome. In the case of the low-risk con-
dition where the odds are 2:1 for win ver-
sus loss (67% to win), the expected value
for the “bet” decision (2  67%  0 
33%) was always higher than that of the
“bank” decision (1  100%). This payoff
scheme could not explainwhy participants
chose to bank in some trials if they made
their decisions solely based on expected
values. Therefore the logic behind the de-
cision was likely to be driven by anticipa-
tion of the outcome, instead of the choice
between two alternative expected values.
However, we could not rule out that their
decisions to bank or bet may also be influ-
enced by other factors such as expected util-
ities of two alternatives, participants’ fram-
ing and assessment of the risk involved in a
specific trial, their perceived randomness of
the outcome (e.g., they may underestimate
the risk after a loss trial), etc.
Areas sensitive to reward delivery and
outcomemonitoring (win vs loss)
The contrast between win and loss trials il-
lustrated positive and negative outcome
monitoring. As shown in Table 2, the cau-
date nucleus, middle OFC, and left middle
frontal cortex as well as the superior/poste-
rior insula becamemore active when partic-
ipants won than when they lost (Fig. 3C). In
contrast, the inferior frontal and superior
medial frontal cortex, anterior insula, supe-
rior temporal pole, and midbrain were sig-
nificantly activated when the outcome was
against the participants (Fig. 3D). It is nota-
ble that there is a mediolateral distinction in
the ventrofrontal cortex between positive
and negative outcome monitoring, similar
to the one observed during positive versus
negative reward anticipation.
We did not, however, observe amygdala and surrounding ar-
eas activated for processing of negative reward information,
which was found in previous studies (Breiter et al., 2001;
O’Doherty et al., 2003a). We speculate that the emotional re-
sponse elicited by the negative consequences (i.e., losing chips)
was not strong enough to activate the amygdala, given that all but
Figure 3. Imaging results. A, C, and E show the striatum (top) and medial/middle OFC (bottom), and B, D, and F show the
lateral OFC and anterior insula/superior temporal pole (top) and dorsomedial frontal cortex (bottom). The right side of the image
is right side of the brain.
Table 2. Brain areas activated during the stage of reward delivery and outcomemonitoring
Label BA Cluster size x y z Max Z
Win loss
Inf. frontal 48 125 34 30 26 3.57
Mid. OFC 11 1491 20 34 16 4.01
Sup. frontal 9 196 24 32 36 3.58
6 151 16 6 52 3.82
Caudate nucleus 25 195 18 16 4 4.38
Putamen 48 82 20 8 4 3.59
Post./sup. insula 48 72 36 18 8 4.16
48 67 36 18 12 3.47
Losswin
Inf. frontal 45 160 52 34 12 4.07
44 35 60 20 20 3.69
Dorsomedial frontal 10 485 2 54 30 3.54
Ant. insula/sup. temporal pole 38 1116 42 14 18 4.94
38 840 40 16 14 5.13
Midbrain 1035 0 30 2 4.85
BA, Brodmann area; Inf., inferior; Sup., superior; Ant., anterior; Mid., middle; Post., posterior; Max, maximum.
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one participant never had a cumulative
chip count lower than zero. Nevertheless,
according to one of the principles of the
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979), the outcome of a gamble is framed
as a gain or loss with respect to a neutral
point instead of the cumulative asset.
Therefore, it is legitimate to compare win-
ning versus losing of each trial to examine
reward process involved in monitoring
positive or negative outcomes. It should be
noted, however, that because of the ab-
sence of strong aversive consequences
(punishment), the mediolateral distinc-
tion observed above may only be present
within the intensity range of the outcomes
tested in this study. Given the lack of this
distinction observed in the literature using
strong negative reinforcers (e.g., pain), ad-
ditional research is needed to assess how
broadly such a distinction may apply to
strong rewarding or aversive stimuli.
Areas sensitive to evaluation of choices
(right vs wrong)
Evaluation of choices can also be distin-
guished by the feedback provided to the
participants. Specifically, when the out-
come of reward matched reward expecta-
tion (“right” decision), the choicewas pos-
itively evaluated (e.g., rejoicing and glad).
This included both banking-and-lost and
betting-and-won. In contrast, when the
outcome did not match expectations
(“wrong” decision), the choice was nega-
tively evaluated (e.g., regretting and sad).
This included both banking-and-won and
betting-and-lost. As shown in Table 3,
positive choice evaluation significantly ac-
tivated the striatum, middle and superior
OFC, as well as the middle frontal cortex
compared with negative choice evaluation
(Fig. 3E). In contrast, the inferior frontal
and dorsomedial frontal cortex, including
the ACC, superior temporal pole, and an-
terior insula, became more active when
participants negatively evaluated their de-
cision compared with when they made the
right choice (Fig. 3F).
Similar and unique regions for different
reward processing stages and distinct
areas for positive and negative valences
of these processes
As illustrated in a conjunctive overlay in
Figure 4A, the positive aspect of each of
the three reward processes recruited similar regions along the
medial aspects of the brain, including the caudate nucleus, and
medial/middleOFC. Figure 4Bdisplays the details of overlapping
activation in the left and right striatum. In contrast, the negative
aspect of each of the three processes demonstrated similar neural
profiles in the ventrolateral areas, such as the lateralOFC, inferior
frontal cortex, anterior insula, and superior temporal pole, aswell
as the dorsomedial frontal cortex (Fig. 4C). Figure 4D displays
the details of overlapping activation in the left and right OFC and
anterior insula regions.
We also performed direct contrasts between different phases
to determine brain regions uniquely activated in a specific phase
more than the others (supplemental Table 3, available at www.
jneurosci.org as supplemental material). In examining brain ac-
Table 3. Brain areas activated during the stage of choice evaluation
Label BA Cluster size x y z Max Z
Rightwrong
Mid. frontal 46 64 40 34 24 3.14
Mid. OFC 47 256 34 56 12 3.85
46 40 42 56 8 3.42
Sup. OFC 11 264 22 42 14 3.97
11 78 18 44 18 3.56
11 56 24 56 2 3.27
Striatum 25 1149 14 18 2 5.15
25 938 20 4 22 4.65
Wrong right
ACC 32 235 6 52 24 3.92
24 50 4 20 24 3.29
Subgenual ACC 11 34 2 26 10 3.38
Inf. frontal 45 65 54 26 8 3.30
Ant. med. OFC 11 73 0 56 8 3.37
Ant. insula/sup. temporal pole 38 495 54 14 14 3.99
38 493 36 10 22 3.93
BA, Brodmann area; Inf., inferior; med., medial; sup., superior; Ant., anterior; Mid., middle; Max, maximum.
Figure 4. Conjunctive overlay of positive (A) and negative (B) aspects of reward processing and detailed coronal slices of
overlapping regions of positive reward processing in the striatum (C) and negative reward processing in the lateral OFC and
anterior insula (D).
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tivation patterns resulting from these direct contrasts, we noted,
however, that these patterns may not be specific to a certain re-
ward process per se. For example, the decision stage (bet/bank)
involved a motor response and simple visual input, whereas the
outcome stage (win/loss) involved complex visual input but no
motor response. The direct contrast revealed that the decision
stage activated the motor cortex to a higher degree, whereas the
outcome stage significantly recruited the visual cortex. However,
these activation patterns were not specific to reward processing.
Also, because the processes involved in different stages were not
controlled, direct contrasts between these phases could not pin-
point specific reward-related functions.
Region of interest analysis of the striatal and lateral
OFC/insula areas
Through conjunctive masking, we identified two medial striatal
areas (Fig. 4B) and two lateral OFC/insula areas (Fig. 4D) com-
monly activated by the valence contrast (positive vs negative)
across various stages. ANOVA analyses were performed on aver-
age signal intensity extracted from these ROIs (Fig. 5). We con-
firmed that there were significant valence effects across these
ROIs. Additionally, we found that although the valence effects
did not differ across different phases (no significant valence by
stages interaction), the main effect of reward phases indicated
that these three stages engaged these ROIs differentially. Activa-
tion patterns were similar between the decision and outcome
phases, whereas the profile for the evaluation phase presented a
slightly different pattern.
To illustrate common and distinct involvement of these me-
dial (left and right striatum) and lateral (lateral OFC/anterior
insula) ROIs in different aspects of reward processing, we plotted
their respective time courses for different conditions. As shown in
Figure 6, positive anticipation of reward (bet) activated the bilat-
eral striatum more than negative anticipation (bank), at 4–6 s
after the choices were made. In parallel, positive outcome (win)
also activated these areas to a higher degree than negative out-
come (loss), at 8–10 s after the outcomes were revealed. Similar
time courses of the striatum for choice evaluation were also ob-
served. Positive evaluation of right choices significantly activated
the striatum, compared with negative evaluation of wrong
choices, at 4–10 s after the consequence of the choice became
clear. In contrast, the lateral OFC and anterior insula regions
displayed greater activation for negative anticipation, outcome,
and choice evaluation (Fig. 6).
Another interesting finding from this analysis concerns differ-
ent neural substrates for factual and counterfactual reward pro-
cesses. Counterfactual reasoning, often in the form of “if only I
had acted differently,” is an important type of reasoning under-
lying human causal inference. In the current context, counterfac-
tual thinking manifested itself most clearly when we compared
the two banking conditions, in which the actual gain was not
affected by the outcomes. However, having participants witness
the outcome even after they banked prompted them to realize
that “this would have happened if only I had bet.” An added value
of examining counterfactual comparison in the reward task is
that it helps disentangle the effects of attention and reward-
related processes on the neurophysiological measures (e.g., fMRI
signals) as mentioned by Maunsell (2004). Because counterfac-
tual comparison reflects the interaction between different stages
of reward processing such that reward expectancy modifies the
experience of an outcome, it helps rule out the possibility that the
signals observed in these reward-related processes are potentially
caused by an alteration of attention allocation.
To investigate counterfactual comparison, we examined
choice evaluation more closely by breaking down the right and
wrong choices into four different conditions and plotting the
time courses of the conjunctive ROIs for these conditions (Fig. 7).
Activity in the striatum was determined by the combination of
decision and outcome for making the right choice. Both the bet-
win and bank-loss conditions (correct choices to maximize gain
and prevent loss) activated bilateral striatum significantly higher
than the two incorrect choices (i.e., suffer a loss for the bet-loss
condition and fail to profit for bank-win condition). Although
the actual gain was not affected by the outcomes after a banking
choice, participants devaluated their banking choice when they
would have won and doubled their chips had they decided to bet.
The striatal response for this bank-win condition was even lower,
in rank, than the bet-loss conditionwhen participants suffered an
actual loss (Fig. 7A,B).
In contrast, a different counterfactual comparison patternwas
observed in the lateral OFC and anterior insula. These regions
were significantly activated by both counterfactual regret in the
bank-win scenario and counterfactual relief in the bank-loss sce-
nario (Fig. 7C,D). For example, one comparison was between
bet-loss and bank-win conditions, both of which were “wrong”
and led to a negative feeling of regret. However, the regret in the
former case was indicative (“I bet but I lost”), whereas the regret
in the latter case was counterfactual (“I would have won had I
bet”). A similar comparison was between bet-win and bank-loss.
Both scenarios were “right” and led to a positive feeling of relief.
Again, the former was indicative (“I bet and won”), whereas the
latter was counterfactual (“I would have lost had I bet”). Alterna-
tively, this pattern of activity in the OFC and anterior insula may
simply be driven by the decision to bank. However, the responses
of the OFC and anterior insula in Figure 7, C and D, were quite
different from those shown in Figure 6 in two aspects. First, the
time courses were time locked to the onsets of the events. The
responses peaked at 4–6 s after a decisionwasmade,whereas they
peaked at 4–8 s after the consequence of the decision became
evident, which itself was at least 2 s after a decision was made.
Second, the differences in decision (bet vs bank) were driven by
more negative activation for the “bet” choice, whereas the differ-
ences in evaluation (factual vs counterfactual) were driven by
more positive activation for the counterfactual comparison.
Discussion
A range of decision theories, including classical expected utility
theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944), prospect theory
Figure 5. Regional BOLD response of the conjunctive ROIs in the left and right striatum
(positive processes negative processes) and left and right OFC and anterior insula (negative
processes positive processes).
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(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), and re-
gret theory (Loomes and Sugden, 1982;
Mellers, 2000), could each offer great in-
sights about why people behaved the way
they behaved in this gambling task. For in-
stance, whereas the expected value of
banking was equal to that of betting in the
high-risk condition (both equal to the
number of chips at stake), by preferring
betting to banking people were presum-
ably maximizing expected utility. How-
ever, it is important to recognize that no
single factor is able to explain the full range
of results reported here. It seems clear that
the adopted strategy depends on multiple
factors, including the participant’s atti-
tude toward risk, framing of the outcome,
emotional response, and even the context
(e.g., reward history). By contrasting dif-
ferent conditions (bank/bet, win/loss,
right/wrong, factual/counterfactual), the
current study allows us to examine the
possible functional distinction in frontal
and striatal areas for reward processing
across different stages.
One distinction has to do with the rela-
tionship between reward anticipation and
reward delivery. Some neuroimaging
studies have suggested that different brain
regions are involved in reward expectation
and reward delivery (Knutson et al.,
2001b). They found that the nucleus ac-
cumbens was significantly activated when
participants were anticipating reward
(Knutson et al., 2001a), whereas themesial
prefrontal cortex was preferentially re-
cruited during reward delivery (Knutson
et al., 2003). However, results from other
studies question such a distinction. Rogers
et al. (2004) found that positive outcomes
activated both the striatum and medial
OFC more than negative outcomes at the
phase of reward delivery. Delgado et al.
(2005) reported that both anticipation and
outcome stages of reward recruited the
caudate nucleus. Moreover, Breiter et al. (2001) found that both
nucleus accumbens and OFC were similarly activated during
both phases of reward anticipation and delivery of reward.
Single-cell recording studies in animals have also shown that
neurons in both OFC and striatum increased firing during both
expectation and delivery of reward [Schultz et al. (2000), their
Fig. 9], under phasicmodulation ofmidbrain dopamine neurons
(Schultz, 1998). Such an animal model has been supported by
neuroimaging studies in humans as well (Braver and Brown,
2003). The striatum (Pagnoni et al., 2002; McClure et al., 2003)
and OFC (O’Doherty et al., 2003b) are the primary brain regions
targeted by such dopaminergicmodulation in reward processing.
Consistent with this neuroimaging and neurophysiological
evidence, we found that both reward expectation and reward
delivery recruited similar brain regions in the medial/middle
OFC and striatum when the outlook of reward processing was
positive. In addition, when outcome did not match expectation,
which resulted in a negative prediction error, activity in these
regions attenuated and even dropped below the baseline. Deacti-
vation of these regions for negative prediction errors has been
documented in previous studies (Knutson et al., 2001b; McClure
et al., 2003; O’Doherty et al., 2003b). These findings suggest that
both medial/middle OFC and striatum are commonly recruited
in reward expectation, outcome monitoring, and choice evalua-
tion. This idea is in accordance with the concept of cognitive-
affective interaction in choice behavior (Mellers, 2000). Choices
are made based on expected utilities. Comparison between the
obtained and alternative outcomes affects the anticipated feelings
of obtaining a certain outcome (e.g., regret or relief). These an-
ticipated feelings, in turn, modify the utility function. Therefore,
it is reasonable for these different reward processes to share cer-
tain neural circuitry.
A second distinction is related to processing of positive versus
negative reward information. The current results corroborated
themediolateral distinction within the OFC for positive and neg-
ative reward processing (O’Doherty et al., 2001) [see ameta anal-
Figure6. Time course plots of the conjunctive ROIs for various stages of rewardprocessing of positive (solid lines) andnegative
(dashed lines) information. The left and right striatum show greater responses to the positive aspects of reward processing,
whereas the left and right OFC and anterior insula areas show greater responses to the negative aspects of reward processing.
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ysis by Kringelbach and Rolls (2004)]. When participants ex-
pected to win, actually won the chips, and positively evaluated
their choices, the medial/middle areas of the OFC became more
active, compared with when the outlook of reward processing
was negative. The striatum showed similar activation patterns as
themedialOFC. In contrast, the lateral areas, including the lateral
OFC, anterior insula, and superior temporal pole, were signifi-
cantly activated for negative reward processes during anticipa-
tion, outcome, and choice evaluation. Previous studies have
shown that the anterior insula is involved in negative emotion
and reward-related processing (for review, see Phan et al., 2002),
given its close reciprocal connectionwith the amygdala. Critchley
et al. (2001), using a card-guessing reward task, found that activ-
ity of the anterior insula and lateral OFC positively correlated
with the risk involved. Paulus et al. (2003) reported that activity
of the insula became stronger when participants selected a more
risky choice versus a safer one. The right insula was also signifi-
cantly activated by the punishing trials. Kuhnen and Knutson
(2005) found that relative loss between the chosen and unchosen
stocks activated the anterior insula. However, it should be noted
that studies using physiological stimuli (e.g., taste) suggest that
activity in both the insula and ventral striatum may be driven by
the stimulus intensity aswell as the valence of stimuli (Small et al.,
2003) or subjective preference (O’Doherty et al., 2006).
Another distinction is related to choice evaluation in reward
processing. Emotional responses associated with choice assess-
mentmay exert a significant influence on future reward behavior.
Usually choice evaluation involves determining whether the an-
ticipated reward is realized or not (i.e., prediction error) as well as
whether the alternative is better or worse (i.e., counterfactual
comparison). When there is no negative prediction error, people
likely evaluate their choice positively and choose to maintain
their decision-making strategy. Otherwise,
they negatively evaluate their choice and
adjust their future responses. In the
present study, we found that positive eval-
uation of right choices activated similar
brain areas as other positive reward pro-
cesses, such as the middle OFC and stria-
tum. In contrast, negative evaluation of
wrong choices significantly recruited the
bilateral superior temporal pole extending
to the anterior insula. The role of anterior
insula in negative emotions such as regret
(Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005) and disgust
(Sanfey et al., 2003) in reward behavior
may affect peoples’ decision strategy and
lead them to adjust their future choice
behavior.
Counterfactual comparison also plays a
critical role in choice evaluation and activ-
ity of the reward circuitry. This process in-
volves comparison of the obtained out-
come and the outcome of an alternative
choice.When the alternative yields a better
outcome than the executed choice does,
people usually experience negative emo-
tion such as regret and reevaluate utilities
associated with different options. For ex-
ample, the “what if” scenario resulted from
the bank-win condition caused partici-
pants devaluate their banking decision, be-
cause they would have profited more from
the alternative choice. Although the actual gain did not depend
on the outcome after the banking decision, the striatum showed
significant deactivation for the bank-win condition, compared
with the bank-loss condition. This result confirms a similar find-
ing (Breiter et al., 2001), in which activity in the nucleus accum-
bens was sensitive to counterfactual comparison. In contrast, ac-
tivity in the lateral OFC and anterior insula was driven by both
counterfactual regret in the bank-win scenario and counterfac-
tual relief in the bank-loss scenario (Fig. 7C,D). The counterfac-
tual conditions showed higher activation than the corresponding
factual conditions, indicating that bilateral OFC and anterior in-
sula were closely related to counterfactual reward processing.
This result is consistent with another fMRI study on counterfac-
tual comparison (Ursu and Carter, 2005).
Positive and negative evaluation of choicesmay have different
effects in guiding future decision-making behavior. Present be-
havioral results suggested that participants adopted different
strategies based on the outcomes from the previous trials. When
they won, the likelihood of choosing to bet versus bank implicitly
followed the “ideal” ratios of win versus loss. However, after a
loss, they completely abandoned this strategy and became more
likely to bet. This win-stay-lose-switch strategy is often observed
in reinforcement learning in both animals and humans. The me-
diolateral distinction we observed suggests the roles of themedial
areas in maintaining response strategy and the lateral areas in
adjusting choice behavior (Cools et al., 2002; O’Doherty et al.,
2003a).
The dorsomedial frontal activation observed for negative re-
ward processes in the current study also supports the role of the
ACC in response switching (Bush et al., 2002; O’Doherty et al.,
2003a). Event-related potential studies on error-related negativ-
ity point to the ACC as the source for negative reward prediction
Figure 7. A–D, Time course plots for the breakdown of the right and wrong choices. Activity in the striatumwas sensitive to
the combination of decision and outcome for making the right choice (solid lines). Although the actual gain was not affected by
the outcome after a banking choice, the reduced striatal activity for the bank-win scenario clearly demonstrated counterfactual
comparison. Participants devaluated the gain when they could have doubled their chips had they bet. Activity in the lateral OFC
and anterior insulawas driven by counterfactual reasoning after a banking choice (squaremarkers). “What if I had bet” produced
counterfactual regret (bank-win, “I could have doubled the chips”) or relief (bank-loss, “I could have lost”), compared with the
factual regret (bet-loss, “I lost”) or relief (bet-win, “I won”).
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errors (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004; Yeung et al., 2005), which may
be responsible for switching behavior. Kennerley et al. (2006)
found that ACC lesion in the nonhuman primate impaired the
animal’s ability to sustain rewarded responses and suggested that
the ACC was critical in guiding choice behavior based on the
consequences of previous actions.
In conclusion, the current study revealed a functional distinc-
tion in frontal and striatal areas for processing of positive and
negative reward information at various phases. A better under-
standing of common and distinct involvement of these regions in
reward processing will not only help model complex reward-
related decision making but also aid in developing treatments
targeted toward disruption of different components of reward
circuitry.
References
BecharaA (2005) Decisionmaking, impulse control and loss ofwillpower to
resist drugs: a neurocognitive perspective. Nat Neurosci 8:1458–1463.
Braver TS, Brown JW (2003) Principles of pleasure prediction: specifying
the neural dynamics of human reward learning. Neuron 38:150–152.
Breiter HC, Aharon I, Kahneman D, Dale A, Shizgal P (2001) Functional
imaging of neural responses to expectancy and experience of monetary
gains and losses. Neuron 30:619–639.
BushG, Vogt BA,Holmes J, Dale AM,GreveD, JenikeMA, Rosen BR (2002)
Dorsal anterior cingulate cortex: a role in reward-based decision making.
Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 99:523–528.
Chau DT, Roth RM, Green AI (2004) The neural circuitry of reward and its
relevance to psychiatric disorders. Curr Psychiatry Rep 6:391–399.
Cools R, Clark L,OwenAM,Robbins TW (2002) Defining the neuralmech-
anisms of probabilistic reversal learning using event-related functional
magnetic resonance imaging. J Neurosci 22:4563–4567.
Critchley HD, Mathias CJ, Dolan RJ (2001) Neural activity in the human
brain relating to uncertainty and arousal during anticipation. Neuron
29:537–545.
Deichmann R, Gottfried JA, Hutton C, Turner R (2003) Optimized EPI for
fMRI studies of the orbitofrontal cortex. NeuroImage 19:430–441.
Delgado MR, Locke HM, Stenger VA, Fiez JA (2003) Dorsal striatum re-
sponses to reward and punishment: effects of valence and magnitude
manipulations. Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci 3:27–38.
Delgado MR, Miller MM, Inati S, Phelps EA (2005) An fMRI study of
reward-related probability learning. NeuroImage 24:862–873.
Drevets WC (2001) Neuroimaging and neuropathological studies of de-
pression: implications for the cognitive-emotional features of mood dis-
orders. Curr Opin Neurobiol 11:240–249.
Elliott R, Friston KJ, Dolan RJ (2000) Dissociable neural responses in hu-
man reward systems. J Neurosci 20:6159–6165.
Fellows LK (2004) The cognitive neuroscience of human decisionmaking: a
review and conceptual framework. Behav Cogn Neurosci Rev 3:159–172.
Garavan H, Stout JC (2005) Neurocognitive insights into substance abuse.
Trends Cogn Sci 9:195–201.
Goudriaan AE, Oosterlaan J, de Beurs E, Van den Brink W (2004) Patho-
logical gambling: a comprehensive review of biobehavioral findings. Neu-
rosci Biobehav Rev 28:123–141.
Holroyd CB, Coles MG (2002) The neural basis of human error processing:
reinforcement learning, dopamine, and the error-related negativity. Psy-
chol Rev 109:679–709.
Kahneman D, Tversky A (1979) Prospect theory: an analysis of decision
under risk. Econometrica 47:263–291.
Kennerley SW,WaltonME, Behrens TE, BuckleyMJ, RushworthMF (2006)
Optimal decisionmaking and the anterior cingulate cortex. Nat Neurosci
9:940–947.
Knutson B, Adams CM, Fong GW, Hommer D (2001a) Anticipation of
increasing monetary reward selectively recruits nucleus accumbens.
J Neurosci 21:RC159(1–5).
Knutson B, Fong GW, Adams CM, Varner JL, Hommer D (2001b) Dissoci-
ation of reward anticipation and outcome with event-related fMRI. Neu-
roReport 12:3683–3687.
KnutsonB, FongGW,Bennett SM,AdamsCM,HommerD (2003) A region
of mesial prefrontal cortex tracks monetarily rewarding outcomes: char-
acterization with rapid event-related fMRI. NeuroImage 18:263–272.
Knutson B, Taylor J, Kaufman M, Peterson R, Glover G (2005) Distributed
neural representation of expected value. J Neurosci 25:4806–4812.
Kringelbach ML (2005) The human orbitofrontal cortex: linking reward to
hedonic experience. Nat Rev Neurosci 6:691–702.
Kringelbach ML, Rolls ET (2004) The functional neuroanatomy of the hu-
man orbitofrontal cortex: evidence from neuroimaging and neuropsy-
chology. Prog Neurobiol 72:341–372.
Kuhnen CM, Knutson B (2005) The neural basis of financial risk taking.
Neuron 47:763–770.
Loomes G, Sugden R (1982) Regret theory: an alternative theory of rational
choice under uncertainty. Economic J 92:805–824.
Maunsell JH (2004) Neuronal representations of cognitive state: reward or
attention? Trends Cogn Sci 8:261–265.
McClure SM, BernsGS,Montague PR (2003) Temporal prediction errors in
a passive learning task activate human striatum. Neuron 38:339–346.
Mellers BA (2000) Choice and the relative pleasure of consequences. Psy-
chol Bull 126:910–924.
MintunMA, Fox PT, RaichleME (1989) A highly accurate method of local-
izing regions of neuronal activation in the human brain with positron
emission tomography. J Cereb Blood Flow Metab 9:96–103.
Montague PR, Berns GS (2002) Neural economics and the biological sub-
strates of valuation. Neuron 36:265–284.
Montague PR, King-Casas B, Cohen JD (2006) Imaging valuationmodels in
human choice. Annu Rev Neurosci 29:417–448.
Nieuwenhuis S, Holroyd CB, Mol N, Coles MG (2004) Reinforcement-
related brain potentials frommedial frontal cortex: origins and functional
significance. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 28:441–448.
Nieuwenhuis S, Heslenfeld DJ, von Geusau NJ, Rogier BM, Holroyd CB,
Yeung N (2005) Activity in human reward-sensitive brain areas is
strongly context dependent. NeuroImage 25:1302–1309.
O’Doherty JP, Kringelbach ML, Rolls ET, Hornak J, Andrews C (2001) Ab-
stract reward and punishment representations in the human orbitofron-
tal cortex. Nat Neurosci 4:95–102.
O’Doherty JP, Critchley H, Deichmann R, Dolan RJ (2003a) Dissociating
valence of outcome from behavioral control in human orbital and ventral
prefrontal cortices. J Neurosci 23:7931–7939.
O’Doherty JP, Dayan P, Friston K, CritchleyH, Dolan RJ (2003b) Temporal
difference models and reward-related learning in the human brain. Neu-
ron 38:329–337.
O’Doherty JP, Buchanan TW, Seymour B, Dolan RJ (2006) Predictive neu-
ral coding of reward preference involves dissociable responses in human
ventral midbrain and ventral striatum. Neuron 49:157–166.
Pagnoni G, Zink CF, Montague PR, Berns GS (2002) Activity in human
ventral striatum locked to errors of reward prediction. Nat Neurosci
5:97–98.
Paulus MP, Rogalsky C, Simmons A, Feinstein JS, Stein MB (2003) In-
creased activation in the right insula during risk-taking decisionmaking is
related to harm avoidance and neuroticism. NeuroImage 19:1439–1448.
Phan KL, Wager T, Taylor SF, Liberzon I (2002) Functional neuroanatomy
of emotion: a meta-analysis of emotion activation studies in PET and
fMRI. NeuroImage 16:331–348.
Ramnani N, Elliott R, Athwal BS, Passingham RE (2004) Prediction error
for free monetary reward in the human prefrontal cortex. NeuroImage
23:777–786.
Rogers RD,RamnaniN,MackayC,Wilson JL, Jezzard P,CarterCS, Smith SM
(2004) Distinct portions of anterior cingulate cortex andmedial prefron-
tal cortex are activated by reward processing in separable phases of
decision-making cognition. Biol Psychiatry 55:594–602.
Sanfey AG, Rilling JK, Aronson JA, Nystrom LE, Cohen JD (2003) The neu-
ral basis of economic decision-making in the Ultimatum Game. Science
300:1755–1758.
Schultz W (1998) Predictive reward signal of dopamine neurons. J Neuro-
physiol 80:1–27.
Schultz W (2002) Getting formal with dopamine and reward. Neuron
36:241–263.
Schultz W (2006) Behavioral theories and the neurophysiology of reward.
Annu Rev Psychol 57:87–115.
SchultzW, Tremblay L, Hollerman JR (2000) Reward processing in primate
orbitofrontal cortex and basal ganglia. Cereb Cortex 10:272–284.
Small DM, Gregory MD, Mak YE, Gitelman D, Mesulam MM, Parrish T
(2003) Dissociation of neural representation of intensity and affective
valuation in human gustation. Neuron 39:701–711.
4596 • J. Neurosci., April 25, 2007 • 27(17):4587–4597 Liu et al. • Reward Anticipation, Delivery, and Evaluation
Tanaka SC, Doya K, Okada G, Ueda K, Okamoto Y, Yamawaki S (2004)
Prediction of immediate and future rewards differentially recruits
cortico-basal ganglia loops. Nat Neurosci 7:887–893.
Tobler P, O’Doherty JP, Dolan RJ, Schultz W (2006) Reward value coding
distinct from risk attitude-related uncertainty coding in human reward
systems. J Neurophysiol 97:1621–1632.
Trepel C, Fox CR, Poldrack RA (2005) Prospect theory on the brain? To-
ward a cognitive neuroscience of decision under risk. Brain Res Cogn
Brain Res 23:34–50.
Tversky A, Kahneman D (1981) The framing of decisions and the psychol-
ogy of choice. Science 211:453–458.
Ullsperger M, von Cramon DY (2003) Error monitoring using external
feedback: specific roles of the habenular complex, the reward system, and
the cingulate motor area revealed by functional magnetic resonance im-
aging. J Neurosci 23:4308–4314.
Ursu S, Carter CS (2005) Outcome representations, counterfactual com-
parisons and the human orbitofrontal cortex: implications for neuroim-
aging studies of decision-making. Brain Res Cogn Brain Res 23:51–60.
Volkow ND, Wise RA (2005) How can drug addiction help us understand
obesity? Nat Neurosci 8:555–560.
Volkow ND, Fowler JS, Wang GJ (2003) The addicted human brain: in-
sights from imaging studies. J Clin Invest 111:1444–1451.
von Neumann J, Morgenstern O (1944) Theory of games and economic
behavior. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP.
Xiong J, Gao JH, Lancaster JL, Fox PT (1995) Clustered pixels analysis for
functional MRI activation studies of the human brain. Hum Brain Mapp
3:287–301.
Yeung N, Holroyd CB, Cohen JD (2005) ERP correlates of feedback and
reward processing in the presence and absence of response choice. Cereb
Cortex 15:535–544.
Liu et al. • Reward Anticipation, Delivery, and Evaluation J. Neurosci., April 25, 2007 • 27(17):4587–4597 • 4597
